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ABSTRACT 
In the recent past, Vietnam has dramatically increased its investment relationship and trade with the United 
States. At the same time, United States foreign direct investment and trade with China has been decreasing. 
This is even more significant when we are in a period of internal growth within the United States. Using 
comparative business system analysis theory and a mixed method approach we conclude that Vietnam is 
turning into the new China for United States firms due to the fewer differences that exist between their business 
systems. The Chinese business system has major differences when compared with the economic system of the 
United States, whereas the Vietnam system has closer resemblance to the United States system. We have laid 
out inferences of our arguments for future research, particularly in the area of institutional comparative 
advantage. 
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advantage. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
From the mid-1970s through the mid-1990s, trade and commerce between the United States (U.S.A.) 
and Vietnam was essentially non-existent. That was largely due to the ripple effects from the end of the 
Vietnam War. U.S. President Gerald R. Ford extended former President Richard M. Nixon’s 1964 trade 
embargo on Vietnam, and outlawed bilateral trade, commerce, and financial transactions. Ford’s embargo 
created two decades of heightened tensions between the two countries which did not improve until the Clinton 
administration restored diplomatic relations in 1995. 
The three key reasons why diplomatic relations were restored in 1986 were: (a) a shift from a centrally- 
planned economy to a form of market socialism (Martin, 2016), (b) recovery of the remains of U.S. personnel 
during the war with Vietnam, and (c) Vietnam’s withdrawal from neighboring Cambodia. The economic shift 
was particularly relevant to increased trade and commerce with the U.S., because it was the first time Vietnam 
was really open to trade and commerce internationally instead of relying solely on domestic production, i.e. a 
planned economy. This shift in economic ideology was a crucial step in opening up to international commerce 
and trade with the United States and other nations around the world. 
The recovery of the remains of U.S. soldiers Missing in Action (MIA) and Prisoners of War (POW) 
personnel, and Vietnam’s cease-and-withdraw action in Cambodia had a profound effect on post-war  
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relations. During the war and since, the Vietnamese government placed a great value on the recovery and/or 
recording of burial locations of the remains of U.S. soldiers (Mills-Griffiths, 2016). That could arguably 
be seen as Vietnam’s attempt to show the United States that it wanted to restore diplomatic relations and 
cease tensions. The issue of U.S. MIAs and POWs during the war was a very sore issue in the United States.  
Many people in the United States felt that relations with Vietnam in any shape or form should be withheld 
until the remains of American MIAs and POWs were found and returned. As negotiations between the 
United States and Vietnam regarding POWs and MIAs got more serious in the mid to late 1980’s, the remains 
of some 160+ MIA American soldiers were repatriated, many of which showed distinct evidence of long-term 
storage (Mills- Griffiths, 2016). Further interaction took place in the early 1990’s which can be illustrated 
through the following paragraph (Mills-Griffiths, 2016): 
The Vietnamese provided graves registration lists with names of unaccounted-for Americans. Inclusion of these 
names was likely purposeful, as was filtering through private channels photographs of dead, unaccounted-for 
Americans, some of whose remains have yet to be returned. The Government of Vietnam directed combat 
photography; their soldiers did not own personal cameras, much less carry them. Regardless of mixed or 
conflicting assessments, these and other actions by Vietnamese officials were apparently intended to signal the US 
Government of remains availability for diplomatic and/or economic purposes. 
The fact the Vietnam Government kept and preserved the remains of MIAs and POWs for some 20+ 
years irritated many people, but the fact that the whereabouts of loved ones and a peace of mind was finally 
achieved in knowing the truth helped restore the United States and Vietnam relationship. 
In the year 2000 the U.S. and Vietnam signed a bilateral trade agreement that fostered their bilateral 
relations (Martin, 2016). The U.S. essentially extended particular favor to Vietnam in the Bilateral Trade 
Agreement (BTA), and raised Vietnam to a status of most favorable nation for foreigner relations. The 
countries completed a trade and investment framework agreement and made air transport, textile, and maritime 
agreements (US Department of State, 2016). 
Continued improvements in the bilateral relationship occurred in 2006 when the U.S granted Vietnam 
normal trade relations status. Trade between the two countries increased with the acceptance of Vietnam into 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in January of 2007. Trade between the two countries grew from $4.6 
million in 1992 to almost $33.08 billion in 2014 (Nguyen & Pham, 2015, p 31). Figure 1 below shows the 
changes in trade volumes since 1992: 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Source: (Nguyen & Pham, 2015, pp. 31) 
As shown in the figure 2 below, Vietnam has a trade deficit with China; however, that deficit is less 
than it has been in the past. The reason for this deficit results from the fact that businesses in Vietnam must 
import raw materials, equipment, and machinery from China due to their proximity. Vietnam is currently  
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exporting more goods to Europe and the U.S., with growth rates of 13.2% and 20.2% respectively, instead of 
relying as heavily on China. Exports to Europe and the U.S. are growing at a higher rate than Vietnam’s exports 
to China. Both Vietnam and China share the same top four exports: textiles and garments, telephones and parts, 
foot-wear, and computers and parts (Vietnam Customs Statistics, 2012). 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
Once enemies at war, the U.S. and Vietnam are now major partners in trade and commerce. Aided by 
low wage costs and a zealous government, Vietnam is turning into Asia’s desired spot for foreign investment. 
With almost half of the population of 94.4 million people being under the age of 29 years, it would be tough 
to turn down foreign investment in this potential “goldmine” of a nation (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). 
Unlike Vietnam, China has experienced a decline in a young skilled workforce due to the “one-child 
policy” that was implemented in the late 1970’s. Along with decreased birth rates, the high economic growth 
rates that China has accomplished in the past decades have raised their labor costs to levels that are now 
substantially higher than Vietnam’s. From Figure 3 below, you can see this comparison between the average 
minimum wages in a month in each country: 
 
Figure 3 (figure 1 in AmCham Vietnam, 2013) 
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Figure 4 
Source: (The HR Capitalist, 2013) 
 
For decades, the U.S. had looked to China for cheaper labor, which increased trade between the two 
nations, but this is not the case anymore. With China seeing a 20% raise in labor costs in the last 4 years, 
Vietnam has stayed relatively the same following the China Labor Bulletin in June 2013 and AmCham 
Vietnam in July 2013). 
But with all of these advantages in favor of Vietnam, does that necessarily mean the country has 
become the “New China” to the US? From a trade perspective, the data shows us that since 2006, Vietnam 
has experienced a 663% increase in trade with the United States and has shown continued growth every year 
since then. That compares with a much smaller growth from China (refer to figure 1). Independent of this 
tendency, it should be kept in mind that Vietnam departed from a much lower trade position when compared 
with China. 
Currently, Vietnam is the 28th largest export economy worldwide. The top exports are broadcasting 
equipment, computers, crude petroleum, leather footwear and integrated circuits. The U.S. is the top export 
destination for Vietnam. Vietnam was the United States’ 20th largest country to import from in 2013. The U.S. 
top imports were apparel of different varieties, furniture, bedding and machinery (Census, 2016). 
U.S. investment in Vietnam has also increased of US investment. Since 2011, US investment has 
grown from 1.5 billion USD to 11.6 billion USD (Foreign Investment of Agency, Ministry of Investment, 
Government of Vietnam (FIA), 2015).  That is an increase of almost 800%. In comparison China rose from 
53.66 billion USD to 74.56 billion USD (Statistical, 2016), which is only 73.5% increase for the same period. 
This should not be a surprise since Vietnam has made significant investments in infrastructure in order to 
encourage foreign investment such as in airports, roads and fiber-optic cable networks (Mukherjee, 2016). 
Recent FDI investments in the technology sector include that of Intel and Apple. Since 2010, Intel has 
operated a $1 billion test and assembly plant in Vietnam’s capital, Ho Chi Minh City (Jennings, 2015). Also, 
Apple has shifted a large portion of their smartphone production to the country. On the import side you can 
see from Figures 5 and 6 below, Vietnam ranked #12 in United States imports, but in 2013, Vietnam wasn't 
even found in the top-15. It has since moved up a spot every year and claimed a bit of that trade. 
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Figure 5 
 
 
Source: CIA (2014) 
 
Figure 6 
 
 
However, some may question if the US firms are changing their production investments from China 
to Vietnam, and if this is true how the institutions are influencing that. 
To investigate this problem we draw from the comparative business system literature (Whitley, 1992, 
1999) to understand how the institutions in both countries are influencing this potential trend. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Comparative business system 
Comparative business system theory assumes that nations influence firms through their institutions, 
and firms usually cannot control such influence (Hall & Soskice, 2001). But if it is true that firms depend on 
the institutions and economic organizations presented in a specific economy, it is also true that such institutions 
and economic organizations were built facing important pressures from existing firms, especially from leading 
ones (Whitley, 2007). 
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An important contribution regarding the way that firms operate came from the British sociologist and 
institutionalist Richard Whitley, who coined the concept of ‘business system’ in his (1992) book. He stated 
that a firm’s behavior and nature can be explained by the institutions and other external agents that are 
implemented in an economy that in turn create business systems. 
Firms are pressured by a relational center of forces. It is in such relationships that firms develop 
different dimensions, that are used tacitly by some to strategically to understand what is important for their 
objectives and build up the strategies to lead to superior competitive advantages. 
There is a degree of limited complementariness among different institutions, leading to stable 
business systems, whereas others rearrangements would lead to the opposite situation (Amable, 2000; Whitley, 
1999). Here, in the analysis of these usually stable relations, by tracing the different forces involved, we can 
find the business system. The forces are the different economic agents and interest groups, such as labor, 
shareholders, management, government, communities, agencies and clients. 
Based on the above, and keeping in mind that different countries present different institutions, we 
expect that the same firm would have different strategies and operations when presented in distinctive nations. 
This is why we expect that specific institutional arrangements tend to support specific firms’ 
organizations and will not distribute randomly across nations (Amable, 2003; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Tan & 
Tan, 2005; Whitley, 1998, 1999). Following the same principle, some can expect that the rationality of firms 
FDI and trade will have in mind the host and home countries business system and how they compare. 
Based on the above, in this study we use the Whitley (1999) framework that uses an institutional and 
national economical dimensions to analyze how the business system difference between the US, Vietnam and 
China is influencing US firms decision makers in their process of trading or FDI. The areas that shape 
economic activities and business systems are: the state; the financial system; skill development; control system; 
inter-firm relations; norms and values governing trust; and authority relationships. Furthermore, and following 
the works of Redding (2002) and Redding & Witt (2009), we complemented our research in business system 
with a culture-perspective. Based on that, we compared the culture of the three countries using Hofstede’s 
framework. 
The State 
Vietnam and China states fall into the predatory category (Evans, 1989, 1995). Both countries are based on 
totalitarian systems with a Communist party in power. This has created, in both countries, monopolistic 
organizations that usually are directly connected with the country institutions. 
Looking exclusivity to Vietnam, some can understand that the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) 
has an absolute power over the country’s direction and firm level choices and will not accept that individuals, 
firms, or associations will have any type of influence on the legislator (Witt & Redding, 2013). However, the 
decision making process is very long due to the fact that the decision making process is based on consensus 
among ministries, local and central governmental departments, and the different regions (Ohno, 2009). 
The central government addressed the problem by proceeding with a strong decentralization process 
by giving autonomy to local regions, in a process called localism (Nguyen, 2008). That gave privileges to a 
specific group of firms that were directly connected with such local authorities, by using political lobby, and 
led to the construction of a group of infra-structures, such as airports, ports, universities, and others, that in 
many times are under-utilized (Witt & Redding, 2013). It should not come as a surprise the fact that corruption 
levels are high – Vietnam ranked 103/167 in the corruption index and China 83/167 (Transparency, 2016). At 
the firm level, the bureaucracy is still evident since it is 9 procedures and 31 days in average to get a license 
to start a business in Vietnam.(The World Bank-IBRD-IDA) 
In China, the central government is trying to move towards a developmental phase but the signs are 
still very inconsistent. If on one hand the central government is highly publicizing an anti-corruption campaign; 
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on the other hand the signs on the ground are very much contrary (Lockett, 2016). In fact, in China, the 
Communist Party has supremacy over personnel selection and a well-organized rotation system of officials at 
all levels, undoubtedly signing local officials as subordinates of a strong central governance (Yang, 2004). The 
control by the state has always been the principle of statecraft, and the loss of control is genuinely intimidating 
from the state perspective (Redding & Witt, 2007). We can observe that the Chinese central government 
delegated much of its fiscal and administrative authority to provincial or even local governments (Zhang, 
2006). 
With government decentralization, and after the reforms in the 1970-80’s, some provincial and even 
local government agents were allowed to sponsor firms, as collectives or as stockholding firms (Oi, 1995), 
using them as a way to penetrate a market where there was a strange, uneasy relationship between politics and 
the economy. With such a move, the central government was trying to follow the practice of “think central, act 
local.” Because of this, local governments possess an important incentive to leverage growth since the fiscal 
decentralization allows them to benefit from it (Montinola et al., 1995). Still, the relationship between local 
authorities and firms is a “fuzzy relationship”’ as Lin (2011, p. 80) described, but is also a way of keeping 
“their flexibility to compete in the market place” and to match official interests with their own. 
Some authors (e.g. Lin, 2011; Redding & Witt, 2007), argued that this was one of the most effective 
characteristics that allowed Chinese firms to explore and exploit all the corners of the Chinese market, as well 
as internationally, and one of the reasons for such internally high growth. This behavior on the part of the 
central government may seem very permissive for provincial or local governments, but in fact, and even with 
the central state far from the local reality, such a highly pyramidal, hierarchical, and strong line of command 
can take the lead when necessary, through punishments that can be severe and without questioning, wherein 
provincial or local actors are conscious of such reality and cannot do much. 
The state does not solely influence institutions. The state in China also plays an important role over 
individuals and organizations (Boisot & Child, 1999; Li et al., 2011; Lin, 2011) by providing, for example, 
supervision, selective support, capital control (Lin, 2011), control of the media and the nationality, imposition 
of high levels of bureaucracy and control, and constraints to information, among others. State directives 
legitimize public property rights against the restraints on private property rights (Li et al., 2011), and 
frequently support laws and regulations that favor specific economic agents (Scott, 2002). Regarding state-
owned enterprises, in 2003 the Chinese government created a ministerial-level authority called State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administrative Commission (SASAC) with the responsibility of control, 
supervision, strategic adjustments, and improvement of structure and corporate governance based on modern 
enterprise systems. 
Through the highly bureaucratic system that exists in the different levels of government, or through 
more direct means, the Chinese government acts as an “active hand” over individuals and organizations (Lin, 
2011), contrary to what Walton (2008) defended. It is here that many private foreigner enterprises have 
foreseen potential liabilities. 
In the USA, under the theory of liberal market capitalism, the market driven system is regulated by 
the state, (Whitley, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Schmidt, 2002; Amable, 2003; Hancke et al., 2007). The 
stock-market and regulatory framework plays an important role in the USA, unlike China and Vietnam which 
are more static and predatory. 
 
The financial system 
The financial system in Vietnam is heavily dependent on state-owned banks that are an arm-length 
of the central and local governments. They are the primary providers of institutionalized financial resources to 
firms. With the entrance of the country in the WTO in 2007, one of the most important measures that the 
agreement demanded was measures towards the stock-exchange system and the financial institutions that 
should become less governmental dependent (Witt & Redding, 2013). Nowadays the banking system is open 
to foreigner and private banks that can provide credits to individuals and corporations – HSBC Vietnam is a 
case in point with 100% of offshore ownership. This is a major difference when compared with the Chinese 
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system. The Vietnam stock exchange opened in Ho Chi Minh City in 2000 and later in the Capital Hanoi in 
2005. Currently, the total market capitalization in both stock exchanges is around 26.8 % of the total GDP of 
the country in 2015, compared to 9.56 in 2008 (The World Bank). However, only about two/thirds can be 
marketed freely since the remainder still belongs to large state owned/controlled corporations (Witt & Redding, 
2013). 
Even with the openness of the financial system in the recent past, it still follows its political system 
and the allocation of capital is highly discretionary with state owned/controlled firms having a much better 
access to capital even if many cases present a much higher risk. This fuels a typical economic risk that Vietnam 
is not an exception. In 2015 the state-owned firm’s debt represented11.4% of the total country GDP, and 
totaled approx. 61.3% of the GDP in 2015 (Viet Nam News, Nov 30, 2015). This reality might be even worse 
if we consider the poor audit system that the country holds. On the other hand, private firms have a very low 
access to the financial system and usually needs to look for the “underground” financial capital system that 
when granted, is with exorbitant interest rates (Vuong, 2011). Finally, and following Witt and Redding (2013), 
the shortage of finance has been recompensed by the inflow of transfers from the Vietnamese diaspora 
overseas, which in 2011 represented around 7.8% of the total country GDP. 
The Chinese institutionalized financial system is controlled by the state and, as in many other 
dimensions, is highly imperfect (Buckley et al., 2008; Child & Rodrigues, 2005), not transparent, and does not 
follow market rules of competition. Even with high levels of liquidity (Lei, 2012), the allocation of such 
liquidity is far from being egalitarian and balanced by different agents. Furthermore, based on the previous 
conjectures about how the Chinese state centralized system works, financial institutions are expected to fully 
cooperate with the directions of the central government (Lin, 2011). The author said that the 2008 financial 
crisis is a good example: when the central government asked banks to increase their loans, the banks responded 
with unanimity by releasing large credits throughout the economy. 
Contrary to what we would expect in a developed economy, the central bank of China, the most 
important guarantor of the financial system, does not have autonomy from the central government, nor from 
the main financial institutions. This inevitably creates a sense of fragility, impunity, and lack of control in the 
financial system that in turn creates an important potential brittleness. The Chinese institutionalized financial 
system also is characterized by large and dominant institutions, but with an under-developed banking system 
(Johnson et al., 2002; Lei, 2012) and with a lack of expertise in the analysis of project investments. Due to the 
high rate of savings of firms and of the population (Kuijs, 2006), access to capital for Chinese entrepreneurs 
and firms is possible in non-institutional markets, known as shadow banking15. 
The main features of the US financial structure are a small amount of bank loans, a significant stock 
market and a much larger bond market than any of the other areas in relative terms. (Source: Allen, Chui, and 
Maddaloni (2004) p. 492. Original sources: CEIC Data Ltd, International Financial Statistics, and national 
sources). 
The USA is the most market-based economy. Households in the Euro area own significantly fewer 
financial assets than in the other economies with a total of 192% of GDP compared with 306%, 327% and 
267% for the UK, the US and Japan. (Source: Allen, Chui, and Maddaloni (2004) p. 493. Original sources: 
ECB, Federal Reserve Board and Bank of Japan). Compared to developed economies of Europe, UK and 
Japan, USA is an outlier in terms of the direct holdings of shares and other equity. Also, households have 
relatively little in banks. The US has much less investment than the other countries except for the “other” 
category. 
 
Skill development 
The educational system in Vietnam is seen as one of the strongest aspects of its business system. The 
large number of young and working population in age group of 15- 64 is 69.3%, with only 5% over 65.   The 
 
 
 
15 ‘All the credit not regulated by the same standards as conventional bank loans’ Kanbur and Zhang (2005). 
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present literacy level is high. The overall youth literacy rate is 98.06%. The youth literacy rate definition covers 
the population between the ages of 15 to 24 years. (Countrymeters and CIA). The large majority of universities 
are post-millennium and the vocational system exists. At the university level there is an overall low quality 
and more than half of fresh graduates need between six months to one year of post-university trainee (Witt & 
Redding, 2013). The country still faces an important problem of lack of qualified human capital and in the past 
years has been recruiting from overseas in order to meet its necessities. The good news is that these foreign 
human resources will serve as trainees to the Vietnamese workers. Finally, the human resources training is 
done in-house due to cost-savings but with the recognition from firms of its necessity and importance (Witt & 
Redding, 2013). 
The structure of education in China is still very constrained by the education system created by Mao 
Zedong during the Cultural Revolution. The education system is fully controlled by the state, and even today 
foreign schools and universities are not allowed to open and manage facilities without the chancellery of a 
Chinese school and are under the tight control of local authorities. In China there is no system of recognition 
of skills and the technical and vocational educational system is very weak. Where it exists it is organized 
poorly by the state. 
Unions and other agencies of employees do not participate in the organization or certification of 
competencies. In China the labor market is very volatile with workers changing jobs on a regular basis. 
Firms can, up to some degree16, easily dismiss workers based on the rules-of-law17. This does not give firms 
any incentive to invest in training workers since such investment can easily be lost and the results be enjoyed 
by competitors. In fact, firms expect that workers will come with the necessary skills that they would need to 
perform their tasks. Usually, in such societies like China, the educational system is the provider of the 
development and canvassing of such skills. 
Due to its poor level of education, at least from a practical point of view, in China workers are available 
to have a first opportunity at almost any price and conditions since it would be the only way to earn the so 
necessary skills that the market place values and schools are not providing. On the same page, in a typical 
country like China, jobs are planned not to depend highly on people’s skills and originality, which leads to a 
kind of Fordism with mechanization of tasks, control, and low levels of specialization. 
One aspect which is similar between Vietnam and China is state owned enterprises provide long term 
employment and hence the workforce should have developed OJT (Extensive on Job Training) like in Japan, 
Taiwan and Korea and prevent job hopping. Due to the lack of human resource development program and 
incentive structures that encourage the acquisition of valuable skills, there is a subsequent lack of practical 
OJT skills both in China and Vietnam (Hall & Soskice, 2001). 
In terms of the United Nations Educational Index (Calculated using Mean Years of Schooling and 
Expected Years of Schooling), the USA ranks 5th worldwide with a score of 0.89 compared to China which 
ranks 91st with a score of 0.61 and Vietnam which ranks 121 with a score of 0.513 (Education, 2013). So in 
terms of education and skill-sets the USA ranks at the top. On the other hand recent data published by the 
Global PISA in 2015 (Program for International Student Assessment), shows that Vietnam is rising up the 
ranks pretty fast in spite of lack of being a relatively poorer nation. 
In the USA public policies have also been developed to fund or enhance workplace-based training, 
several of which appear to have positive employment and earnings outcomes for workers: (1) subsidized on- 
the-job (OJT), (2) registered apprenticeships, and (3) subsidized jobs and transitional employment. On January 
30, 2014, President Barack Obama signed a memorandum directing Vice President Joseph Biden to lead a 
Government-wide review of Federal programs in the workforce and training system to ensure these programs 
are designed to equip the Nation’s workers with skills matching the needs of employers looking to hire. This 
 
 
16 If workers are less than 5 years to retirement or more than 15 years in the company, firing can become more 
complicated. Otherwise the market presents a flexible human resources policy based on financial compensations. 17中
华人民共和国劳动合同法 - Labor Contract Law of PR 
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review, which involved the Secretaries of Labor, Commerce, Education, Health and Human Services, and staff 
from other Federal agencies, culminated in an action plan to make the workforce and training system more 
job-driven, integrated, and effective. (US Department of Labor report, July 2014)). 
In the USA the federal government works with all four agencies, namely department of labor, 
education, commerce and health and human services to enhance skills based on demands in the economy. At 
the state level too there are many skill based educational and training programs supporting the skill based work 
force. For example, in the State of Minnesota programs are developed through DEED (Minnesota Department 
of Education and Employment Department). 
 
Control system and ownership 
The firms in Vietnam lean to be hierarchical in structure and patriarchal in operation with specialized 
tasks, meaning that workers do not have many motives to excel (Witt & Redding, 2013). The same authors 
explain that due to its country history, the Vietnamese companies still hold a centralized decision-making and 
complex structures, which give rise to task replications and large number of procedures, some of which are 
completely unnecessary. The decision process follows a top-down system with low levels of participation or 
contribution from lower levels. As in others Confucianism societies, status is very important and a powerful 
tool for growth in business. 
The decisions are usually at the top of the organization and departments as finances and human 
resources are centralized (Witt & Redding, 2013). However, for strategic decisions the middle and low 
managerial levels are not heard, the same does not happen in the implementation phase where one would 
expect vertical and horizontal communications. Interestingly to notice is the fact that the promotions are based 
on merit even in family owned firms where some would expect nepotism. This might be a consequence of the 
long Western influence in managerial activities as Truong and Van Der Heijden (2009) explained that led to a 
more professional approach instead of a pure Confucian one. However, there is still resistance on delegation 
of tasks. 
In terms of ownership, the firms in Vietnam are usually state owned enterprises (SOEs), controlling 
around 11.4 % of the GDP in 2015, (Vietnam News) or private owned enterprises (POEs), the latter being in 
the large majority family owned. The SOEs are the still dominant pillar of the economic arrangement of the 
country and enjoy privileges as the access and conditions of credit, approvals, and land use (Witt & Redding, 
2013). However, the latest economic expansion of the country is due to the POEs since they present a much 
less bureaucratic internal system, are more open to hire young individuals that are open to innovative ideas, 
and in many cases these young managers have studied new managerial approaches and understand the benefits 
of innovations. 
In relation to the control system and ownership in China, we need to contextualize that capitalism in 
China is about two major interest groups that are predominant and existent in the society, such as in the case 
of Vietnam – family businesses and state controlled enterprises. If the importance of the family business is 
related to their large number, the importance of SCE’s is related to their power, weight in the economy, and 
their straight connections to the legislative and other institutions in China. 
In both groups, the decision makers are in the top ranks of the organizations. The roots of this are 
associated with the path-dependency of recent Chinese history, both its centralized authority and its highly and 
fierce punishment system without a predictable sense. Common to all types of Chinese firms, communication 
is highly vertical from the top to the bottom; a horizontal exchange of ideas is not frequent. The low level of 
upwards communication during the managerial process is notorious and is a remnant of the conservatism of 
Mao’s era (Redding & Witt, 2007). Some (Ibid) argue that this is one of the reasons why Chinese employees 
always dream of owning their own firms. 
The pool of skilled talents in China is poor and the best ones tend to work for international firms 
where their pay is higher, they have more flexibility, and their ‘voice’ is heard. Here is an important 
characteristic of the Chinese business system. It is very common to see that medium and senior managers 
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across a firm do not share any kind of ideas or communication horizontally. Their role is to receive orders from 
above and verify that they are being followed (Redding & Witt, 2007). The authors say that this originates in 
firms that are good doing mass production with highly standardized and specialized tasks allied with the 
discipline and low-cost labor. With such a system, we do not foresee Chinese firms entering into the more 
complex systems of management that are required for multi-national firms or for firms in which the required 
exchange of ideas flows not only horizontally but vertically, and in both directions as well. Furthermore, the 
integration and coordination of variety is an important asset of complex firms and yet to be seen in Chinese 
organizations. 
Two basic characteristics of ownership of U.S. public firms are that U.S. firms are primarily diffusely 
owned and secondly more diffusely owned than comparable firms elsewhere (Tirole, 2006). Similar views are 
expressed by Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2007). According to Denis and McConnell (2003), on an average, 
global ownership is more concentrated in non-U.S. countries. This is very true for Vietnam both in state 
controlled enterprises as well as in private sector family owned business as per the data stated in previous 
section. The obvious question then we can ask and as per (Becht and DeLong, 2005) - Why then there is so 
little block holding in the United States? One of the reasons can be liberal market capitalism as well as a means 
to separate ownership from management, resulting in corporate governance and corporate finance over the past 
70 years (Tirole, 2006). This separation of ownership from management has resulted in the birth of modern 
corporate finance (Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007). The downside of ownership concentration as we see 
in Vietnam or to some extent in China as well as many other countries results in the financial inability to take 
advantage of globalization (Stulz (2005). 
Inter-firm relations 
Even if the political arrangement of Vietnam is based on a totalitarian system, the local authorities 
allow the establishment of associations that can be in the form of professional or industrial associations (Witt 
& Redding, 2013). These associations are one of the main engines for inter-firm relations s one should expect 
the establishment of such relations. However, the country still has a low level of intellectual property and 
copyright protection allied with a defragmented supply-chain that does not foster relations among producers, 
suppliers and distributers, which decreases the propensity for the establishment of such inter-firm relations. 
In China, if on one hand inter-firm relations cannot be held in market relationships since agents do 
not have the grounds for it (namely due to lack of trust in contracts that are a cause of the low quality and 
applicability of the rules-of-law), on the other hand agents cannot trust in inter-firm strategic interactions since 
there are no industrial associations or other institutions that would support, regulate, and incentivize them. 
Such industrial associations neither exist nor are allowed, and there is no institutional ground for their 
development. Inter-firm relations are, because of this, almost non-existent in the Chinese economic 
coordination system, and the transference of technology and know-how happens usually with the transference 
of individuals. Some may ask if firms do not collaborate or cooperate with each other in China? Yes, they do. 
And they do so especially in their ‘comfort zone (also called Guanxi)’ and without the transfer of know-how 
among them. The different elements of the supply-chain have business-to-business transactions without inter- 
firm knowledge transfer. 
The inter-firm relationship for most industries in the USA is based on industry norms as well as the 
regulatory framework for each industry. The relationship in the supply chain is usually pretty strong and it 
enhances the value chains. For publicly listed companies, the relationships are based on the framework as per 
the rules laid down by the regulatory framework and agencies as well as the norms of each trade industry or 
trade associations. In Europe, there are some kinds of institutionalized long term cooperative ties among 
different firms in the same or similar industries (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
 
Norms and values governing trust 
Typical in a Confucianism system, trust is a critical element in Vietnamese business (Witt & 
Redding, 2013). This is aligned with the institutional voids that the Vietnamese legal system still presents. Not 
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surprisingly, the business transactions only happens after such levels of trust are established, which are an 
important hindrance for the economic development compared with the pace that we observe in Western 
countries. However, Quang et al. (1998) found that honesty was critical for managers in their relations with 
business partners, which is a much different when compared with China. Interesting to notice is the fact that 
trust is disseminated throughout Vietnamese society, and people fairly trust each other (Witt & Redding, 2013). 
People who are familiar with China know that the term guanxi (the closest words in English are 
networking/lobbying, but they do not reflect the full magnitude and meaning of the word in Chinese)18 is of 
vital importance. Such importance is the result of the lack of trust in the existing institutions that is extrapolated 
to the relations among individuals, organizations and government entities. The institutions are not the 
guarantee of exchange among the different economic agents and do not generate trust among relative strangers. 
Legal systems are one of the most important aspects of an institutional framework (Merryman, 2007). 
The legal system in China does not provide the assurance of a free and fair trial (Peerenboom, 2001). North 
(1990), said that business transactions in China are not based on contracts and rule-of-law since the transaction 
costs are very high when Chinese institutions have failed. Consequently, this led the economy to a situation of 
trusting more in interpersonal ties, guanxi, than in formal and institutional rules that usually are found in a 
market-orientated economy. Such situations happen frequently with the entities that possess the capability of 
influencing the ‘results of the game’ such as governmental officials. Because of that, it is common to see 
Chinese managers cultivating ties with Chinese officials in order to increase the probability of advantages over 
their competitors, or because of a government bid, a court case, political prestige (Li et al., 2011), or simply to 
use such relation in a future situation. Based on the above, inter-firm cooperation is very low, and the tendency 
to delegate control over resources is severely diminished since it has affected the perception and management 
of risks. Very similar approaches are seen in Vietnam too with state control enterprises and many informal 
relationships and guanxi type of relationships. 
In the US, there is more trust on institutional procedures and norms than on informal interpersonal 
relations. Relationships do play a role but institutional systems, procedures, norms and rule of law triumphs 
over personal relationships and connections. 
 
Authority relationships 
In Vietnam, the SOEs usually presents a matrix structure while POEs commonly have a functional 
and focused market structure (Witt & Redding, 2013). In general, there is a lack of task delegation that does 
not foster the development of large and complex firms. This is particularly important for strategic decisions 
where the senior management do not trust that lower levels would be able to implement some of the decisions, 
namely because they were not involved on their development. In non- strategic decisions we can observe a 
top-down delegation that fosters the horizontal and vertical, in the latter in both directions – top-down and 
down-top. 
In China, the supervisor-subordinate relationship is governed by informal rules, a low degree of direct 
reciprocity, and important gaps in terms of social and moral values between the leader and those led. 
Subordinates also usually have low levels of autonomy and accept changes in lines of command well without 
questioning. The delegation of tasks is almost non-existent in China, which remains an important constraint 
for manager development. 
In the United States, approaches to planning, control, supervision, commitment, motivation, 
scheduling, and deadlines are all influenced by the concept that individuals can control their futures. United 
States scored highest on Hofstede’s individualism scale (Nguyen & Pham, 2015). In cultures with more 
collectivistic and fatalistic beliefs, these good business practices may be followed, but concern for the final 
outcome is different. After all, if one believes the future is determined by an uncontrollable higher order, then 
 
 
 
18 To know more please refer to Sheng and Geng (2013) 
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what difference does individual effort really make? 
The acceptance of the idea that independent enterprise is an instrument for social action is the 
fundamental concept of U.S. corporations? A corporation is recognized as an entity that has rules and 
continuity of existence and is a separate and vital social institution. This recognition can result in strong 
feelings of obligation to serve the company. Indeed, the company may take precedence over family, friends, 
or activities that might detract from what is best for the company. This idea is in sharp contrast to the attitudes 
held by Vietnamese who feel strongly that personal relationships are more important in daily life than work 
and the company, and Chinese, who consider a broader set of stakeholders as crucial. 
Consistent with the view that individuals control their own destinies is the belief that personnel 
selection and reward must be made on merit. The selection, promotion, motivation, or dismissal of personnel 
by U.S. managers emphasizes the need to select the best qualified persons for jobs, retaining them as long as 
their performance meets standards of expectations and continuing the opportunity for upward mobility as long 
as those standards are met. In other cultures, where friendship or family ties may be more important than the 
vitality of the organization, the criteria for selection, organization, and motivation are substantially different 
from those in U.S. companies. 
In some cultures, in private sectors in China and Vietnam organizations expand to accommodate the 
maximum number of friends and relatives. If one knows that promotions are made based on personal ties and 
friendships rather than on merit, a fundamental motivating lever is lost. However, in many other cultures, social 
pressure from one’s group often motivates strongly. Superstitions can even come into play in personnel 
selection; in Japan, a person’s blood type can influence hiring decisions! (Japan Today, January 20, 2012). 
The very strong belief in the United States that business decisions are based on objective analysis and 
that managers strive to be scientific has a profound effect on the U.S. manager’s attitudes toward objectivity 
in decision making and accuracy of data. Although judgment and intuition are important tools for making 
decisions, most U.S. managers believe decisions must be supported and based on accurate and relevant 
information. Thus, in U.S. business, great emphasis is placed on the collection and free flow of information to 
all levels within the organization and on frankness of expression in the evaluation of business opinions or 
decisions. In other cultures, such factual and rational support for decisions is not as important; the accuracy of 
data and even the proper reporting of data are not prime prerequisites. 
The frankness of expression and openness in dealing with data, characteristic of U.S. businesses, do 
not fit easily into some cultures. Frequently existing data are for the eyes of a select few. Compatible with the 
views that one controls one’s own destiny and that advancement is based on merit is the prevailing idea of 
wide sharing in decision making. Although decision making is not a democratic process in U.S. businesses, 
there is a strong belief that individuals in an organization require and, indeed, need the responsibility of making 
decisions for their continued development. Thus, decisions are frequently decentralized, and the ability as well 
as the responsibility for making decisions is pushed down to lower ranks of management. A key value 
underlying the American business system is reflected in the notion of a never-ending quest for improvement. 
The United States has always been a relatively activist society; in many walks of life, the prevailing question 
is “Can it be done better?” 
Business size, ownership, public accountability, and cultural values that determine the prominence of 
status and position (PDI) combine to influence the authority structure of business. In high-PDI countries such 
as Mexico and Malaysia, understanding the rank and status of clients and business partners is more 
important than in more egalitarian (low-PDI) societies such as Denmark. In high-PDI countries, subordinates 
are not likely to contradict bosses, but in low-PDI countries, they often do. As businesses grow and professional 
management develops, there is a shift toward decentralized management decision making. Decentralized 
decision making allows executives at different levels of management to exercise authority over their own 
functions. As mentioned previously, this approach is typical of large-scale businesses with highly developed 
management systems, such as those found in the United States. A trader in the United States is likely to be 
dealing with middle management, and title or position generally takes precedence over the individual holding 
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the job.  
Committee decision making is by group or consensus. Committees may operate on a centralized or 
decentralized basis, but the concept of committee management implies something quite different from the 
individualized functioning of the top management and decentralized decision-making arrangements just 
discussed. Because Asian cultures and religions tend to emphasize harmony and collectivism, it is not 
surprising that group decision making predominates there (Fogel, 2006; Kharti, Eric, Tsang, & Begly, 2006). 
 
Culture  
The cultures of Vietnam, China and the United States are vastly different. It is important to keep 
cultural implications in mind when looking to increase trade and commerce between the two countries. 
Nguyen and Pham (2015) compared the cultural differences based on six dimensions, which were 
developed by Hofstede (Nguyen & Pham, 2015, pp. 32-34). These dimensions as well as an analysis as to 
how these cultural differences impact trade between the two countries are detailed below: 
● Power distance (PDI): The United States has a lower power distance score than Vietnam, indicating 
that Americans are less accepting of an unequal distribution of power. Vietnamese people believe that 
everyone has a different role in society, and it is not necessary for each individual to have equal power. 
The U.S. would benefit by keeping this in mind during trade. We should not target any average 
consumer while trading in order to be inclusive. It would be more beneficial to recognize who holds 
the role of the trader in a particular Vietnamese region and conduct business with them. China has a 
high power distance score. In China, the supervisor-subordinate relationship is governed by informal 
rules, a low degree of direct reciprocity, and important gaps in terms of social and moral values 
between the leader and the followers. Subordinates also usually have low levels of autonomy and 
accept changes in lines of command well without questioning. The delegation of tasks is almost non- 
existent in China, which remains an important constraint for manager development. 
● Individualism/collectivism (IDV): The United States is vastly more individualistic than Vietnam and 
China. China and Vietnam would be classified collectivistic societies with similarly low individualism 
scores. Americans typically are more assertive and independent while Vietnamese and Chinese act in 
groups and do what is best for the group as a whole rather than focusing on personal goals. They also 
commit to and value long-term relationships. To increase trade with Vietnam, the U.S. needs to greatly 
respect this cultural difference. We must consciously work to not be overly assertive. We need to first 
build relationships within Vietnam and then make it evident on how trade will be a benefit to the entire 
group. 
● Masculinity (MAS): The U.S. has a higher masculinity score than Vietnam which shows that 
Americans are competitive and goal-oriented while being driven by personal success. China’s 
masculinity score is a couple of points higher than the U.S. which also shows their drive towards 
personal success. Conversely, Vietnamese people are relationship-oriented and focused on caring for 
others while being driven by group success. It is important that the U.S. develop relationships with 
Vietnamese people. Additionally, while resolving conflicts, Vietnamese typically negotiate to reach a 
compromise instead of making one person right and the other wrong. It is important that we respect 
and incorporate this style of decision-making to ensure that we do not disrespect Vietnamese trading 
partners or damage relationships. 
● Uncertainty avoidance (UAI): The U.S., China, and Vietnam have relatively close uncertainty 
avoidance scores. The U.S. and Vietnam have relatively close uncertainty avoidance scores. Both of 
their scores are below 50 which indicate that each society accepts ideas that deviate from the norm and 
they are open to new ideas. Vietnam’s score is even lower than the United States which shows they 
are likely to try something new. Having low scores is good news for the chances of trading success 
between the two countries. They are both likely to be open to this new idea of increasing trade with 
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one another. Although they have a rocky past, they have the ability to embrace the uncertainty of the 
future and take a chance on the opportunities that will come with stronger trade relationships. 
● Long-term orientation/short-term (LTOWVS): The U.S. has a lower score than Vietnam when long- 
term orientation is measured. This shows that Americans are more likely to focus on the past and 
present, whereas Vietnamese typically focus more on the future. Americans try to analyze information 
to make confirmations while Vietnamese find truth as being contextual. The U.S. tends to make 
decisions on a short-term basis to see immediate results. China, in contrast, has an extremely high 
long-term orientation score showing that they focus very little on the past and present and are almost 
always looking toward the future. This makes sense in the recent growth trend of China. They were 
planning for the future while other countries focused on the present. This mind-set will need to be 
altered in order to increase trade. As stated earlier, it is important to build trust and relationships before 
completely indulging in large-scale trade. This trading partnership can be successful in time, but it will 
not happen overnight. The U.S. will have to act more in-line with the Vietnamese culture and focus 
on long-term rewards. 
● Indulgence/restraint (IVR): The U.S. has an indulgence rating almost twice as large as Vietnam’s, and 
China’s rating is even lower than that of Vietnam. Americans have a “work hard, play hard” mentality 
and therefore find it acceptable to indulge. This could be beneficial for trade between the two countries 
because the U.S. will be likely to indulge in importing many goods. 
Figure 7 below displays the cultural differences between Vietnam and the U.S. based on the six  
   dimensions described above. 
Figure 7 
 
 
 
Source: (Nguyen & Pham, 2015, pp. 33) 
METHODS 
The method used is a mixed methods approach. We started our research by interviewing senior managers in 
10 companies in Minneapolis that pursued FDI in Vietnam. As a result of our epistemological and ontological 
position combined with the necessity of grounding our perspective to give it some structure, it was very natural 
for the researcher to choose Template Analysis (King, 2012) as the main technique of data analysis. The use 
of computer software aided the researcher in analyzing the complex and large quantity of data collected – 
Nvivo in our case. Based on those interviews we built a questionnaire that was distributed among managers in 
US firms that are pursuing FDI in Vietnam and in China. A statistical analysis was performed to answer the 
different propositions. The preliminary analysis of the data is complete but we are currently fine-tuning its 
presentation. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Based on the preliminary analysis of the data we can immediately conclude that the comparative business 
system theory framework is particularly relevant to the study of the increase of US firms FDI and trade 
activities in Vietnam, and we can understand why it is happening at the expense of China. 
This study is particularly relevant for the field of comparative business systems. The lack of use of business 
system theory in the academic international business literature reveals the prejudice that academics researchers 
are focused on past events. What practitioners and governmental officials are eager for, and researchers should 
focus on in research agendas, are not only the study of past events and its rationality but also how those studies 
can try to predict the future. This is where the comparative business system framework plays a critical role. 
The business system framework has shown to be very robust in explaining the rationality of US firms in their 
decision process of moving their FDI from China to Vietnam. 
With this paper we advance the robustness of the business system framework, and explain why the FDI and 
trade with Vietnam will continue to grow at the expense of China. 
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